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Dramatic increases in the capabilities of computers and communication networks have fomented 
revolutionary thoughts (if not the revolution itself) in the scholarly publishing community. Much 
attention is focused on upstart electronic-only journals, and whether they will successfully displace or 
competitively discipline the journals managed by traditional professional publishers. Meanwhile, 
traditional publishers are developing and testing schemes for electronic access to their body of literature. 
This paper concerns a controlled field experiment to investigate the effects of product bundling and 
pricing structures for electronic access to scholarly literature. MacKie-Mason and his colleagues at the 
University of Michigan are implementing the field experiment at the time of this writing. The host 
service team is receiving and preparing digital content. The marketing team is recruiting trial partici- 
pants. The PEAK team is finalizing the details of the bundling and pricing schemes, and the technical 
structures necessary to provide authorization and authentication, accounting, and other services are 
being developed. However, the experimental treatment and data collection have not yet begun. 
The primary research objective is to generate rich empirical evidence on user behavior and 
provider results with various bundling schemes and price levels. In this our work will complement 
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the more theoretical research of Bakos and Brynjolfsson [1] and Chuang and Sirbu [2]. However, 
authors in the bundling literature, including these recent papers, have restricted their models to 
rather simplified bundling structures. Although we are severely limiting the design of the trial in 
order to obtain good data and testable hypotheses, for both practical and intellectual reasons our 
experimental design calls for bundling structures that have not yet been explored theoretically. We 
intend to extend the theoretical work to our more realistic and general structures [3]. 
In this paper we first provide background on the market economics of the publishing business 
and describe some important economic problems facing both research libraries and scholarly 
journal publishers. We then explain how the opportunity provided by electronic access to use 
innovative bundling and pricing structures offers some hope of easing the library and publisher 
problems. New bundling and pricing schemes can uncover new value from both old and new 
scholarly content. In the next section we describe our utility-theoretical framework for analyzing 
the consumer response to the trial conditions, and then briefly survey some related literature on 
bundling and nonlinear pricing. In the final section, we describe the main features of the experiment 
and the rationale behind the design. 
ECONOMICS AND ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING 
Publishing Economics 
Publishing is a value-adding business. This point has been underemphasized by some recent 
authors. Utopians have suggested that by putting technology in the hands of authors, for-profit 
publishers can and inevitably will be bypassed [4]. Electronic scholarly journals will arise that are 
edited, produced, marketed, and distributed by scholars working in the service of scholarship, 
rather than by professional publishers in the service of profit (e.g., Harnad [5] and Odlyzko [6]). 
This striking view conflates two issues: whether or not publishing as a business adds value to 
authorship, and the industrial organization of the business of publishing. Of course, the way in 
which value is added and the structure of costs underlying that value may determine the efficient 
and sustainable organization of the industry. Nonetheless, sources of value and industrial organi- 
zation must be examined separately when technology, costs, and service offerings are drastically 
changing. 
Publishing adds significant value to authoring. The digital revolution is changing sources and 
amounts of value added, but not eliminating it. The costs of some functions are decreasing rapidly, 
but other costs are increasing. Meanwhile, as new information services are developed, new 
opportunities for publishing value added are also created. Publishers provide many services to 
authors and readers. For example, they perform copyediting, proofing, typesetting, layout, printing, 
and binding. The publisher chooses and controls the quality of the medium (whether paper stock, 
SGML tagging, etc.) and production of offprints and supplemental bundles (e.g., CD-ROMs). The 
publisher also handles fulfillment: billing, accounting, and distribution. Even electronic journals 
require distribution skill: server administration, backup maintenance, and network management. 
And even electronic journals have costs that must be covered through some mechanism: publishers 
specialize in cost management and recovery [7]. Perhaps most importantly, the publisher brings 
readers to the author: the marketing function. It is quite evident that scholarly journal authors are 
not writing for direct cash compensation, but to obtain readership (from which indirect compen- 
sation may follow). Good scholars are good at research, not at finding readers [8]. 
There are at least two implications from the considerable value publishing adds to authorship: 
1. There is likely a role for an independent publishing industry; and, 
2. Competition should ensure efficient provision of publishing services. 
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We expect to see independent publishing because there is enough value added separate from 
authorship itself that specialization will continue to be efficient: authors aren't the most fit to 
provide publishing services. If transactions costs between authors and publishers were high, then 
we might expect integration into single organizations, but there is no obvious reason to think such 
transactions costs are important. There are some clear economies of scale that publishers can 
achieve, however, such as in the employment of typesetters, copy editors, and printers, which are 
an advantage for large, multi-journal publishers. 
We believe that our second claim is the more important: whatever organizational form the 
industry takes, competition should lead to efficient provision of publishing services. The argument 
here is quite fundamental and well understood in the economics of industry: there are low entry 
barriers and few proprietary advantages to participation in publishing. One type of entry barrier is 
proprietary control over distinctive intellectual property. It might seem that control over intellectual 
property is a prevalent characteristic of scholarly publishing: authors' work, over which the 
publisher usually has copyright, is unique and valuable. Clearly, different research articles are 
valued differently, or we wouldn't see such wide variation in prices and reputations among journals 
within similar fields and with similar production quality. However, the key to understanding the 
steady-state performance of the publishing industry is to recognize that publishers don't initially 
control content: authors do. Publishers who are currently more successful at bringing readers to 
authors might have an advantage in bargaining for the best new content, but they do not have 
control. If the publisher charges too much to readers or degrades production quality, then another 
publisher can easily step up and offer authors a journal that will be more accessible or more 
appealing to readers. Of course, reputations rarely depreciate overnight. Thus, a publisher who 
produces a journal that is considered the best in its field is likely to maintain its subscription base 
and readership for at least some time. However, academic editorships turn over relatively fre- 
quently, and publishers have to compete to attract new editors, who will pay attention to quality and 
pricing of the journal. Likewise, libraries and other subscribers do not mindlessly subscribe to 
every journal. Indeed, there are very few journals, even among the very best, to which every 
potential subscriber subscribes. There are always marginal purchasers who are willing to forego a 
subscription if the price is a bit too high or the production quality a bit too low. 
The natural competitiveness of the market for publisher services is quite important. First, it is 
a well-known result in economics that if the market participants behave competitively, then the 
outcome will maximize consumer plus producer surplus [9]. Surplus is the excess between value 
received and price paid. The consumers in the market for publishing services are both readers and 
authors; the producers are the providers of publishing services. However, competition also ensures 
that the producers will not receive excess profits. That is, producers will generally only receive 
enough to cover their costs (including a competitive rate of return on invested capital). The rest of 
the maximized surplus will be enjoyed by readers and authors. A competitive market also has the 
property that it is Pareto efficient, which means that no alternative allocation of goods and services 
can make at least one agent better off without making at least one agent worse off. In more 
colloquial terms, the performance of a competitive market in publishing services is quite attractive: 
readers get the best combination of quality, price, and quantity possible given the technology and 
costs of production, and authors get the best readership possible. When new sources of value arise 
(such as searching over a digital document database), much of the value ultimately accrues to 
consumers. Of course, at any given moment, a market may not be performing optimally, but in the 
absence of structural problems (e.g., barriers to entry and externalities) we have a lot of evidence 
that competitive markets perform very well on average, over time. Many readers will no doubt 
wonder whether this optimistic view is justified, given apparent problems for readers and authors 
in the scholarly publishing business. We now discuss some of these problems. 
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Comparison Between Paper and Electronic Publishing 
Introducing electronic publishing to the print industry raises the usual problems of a new 
business: new investments with uncertain revenues and new prototype testing with customers to 
discover the real value-added products. Electronic publishing is expected to co-exist with print 
(rather than entirely replace it). Therefore, there is a need to transform the print business in 
response to production and demand interactions with the electronic business. The simultaneous 
development of electronic publishing and re-engineering of the traditional print business make the 
new business problems especially severe. Some concerns are specific to the publishing business. 
For example, for copyrighted documents there are security concerns at both the customer and 
publisher levels. With Internet technology (with IP addressing as an identifier), it is difficult to 
establish a watertight security system at the end-user level. Customers, especially librarians, have 
a different security concern: who (if anyone) will set up a reliable archive for digital-format 
documents? 
Comparing the cost structures of print and electronic publishing depends on the production 
process used. If the process is completely computer aided, then print and/or electronic products are 
the outcome. In general, it is difficult to make the comparison because the two products have 
different value to consumers. Print on paper seems to be preferred to reading on a monitor, at least 
for complete articles. Electronic publishing facilitates new value-added services, such as hypertext 
links and social filtering. Adding hypertext links or other electronic-specific features will offset 
other cost advantages. In either case, the fixed or "first-copy" costs are large relative to the 
variable or per copy costs. Electronic publishing has significant advantages for both customers and 
publishers. Customers may gain faster and more convenient access (on the desktop workstation, 
rather than in the library). Publishers can obtain much more detailed usage data. We now focus 
specifically on how electronic access may affect two major stakeholder groups: research libraries 
and publishers. 
Electronic Access and Research Libraries 
Research libraries have faced a number of recent difficulties. They are often located in 
institutions of higher education, which have experienced severe budget pressures. In many cases, 
centrally provided infrastructure services--such as libraries provide--have borne more than their 
share of budget reductions. Concurrent with budget reductions, libraries have faced increases in 
subscription prices. The increasing demand for new services based on digital and network 
technology has perhaps made matters worse (although also creating excitement for information 
professionals), as it calls upon already overtaxed human and financial resources. Given this rather 
dismal set of problems, we should consider what opportunities might be provided by electronic 
access to scholarly materials. The first effect that many have hoped for is a reduction in service 
cost. Unfortunately, although some costs are lower when distribution is electronic, these costs tend 
to represent only a modest fraction of the total costs of publishing. Further, libraries need to make 
investments in new technology, network distribution, customer support personnel, and file storage 
systems. We estimate that start-up costs for a digital library host service that handles only 200 
journals for local use may run as high as $100,000. In any case, even if there are significant cost 
savings to be made, the question is not very well posed. Electronic access changes both the profile 
of services available and their quality (which in some cases increases, but in others decreases). Any 
attempt to compare the costs of paper and electronic publishing must carefully account for these 
differences in quality and the services provided: the classic "apples and oranges" problem. 
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Electronic Access and Publishers 
The fundamental problem facing publishers is clear: high first-copy costs. Odlyzko [10] reports 
that it costs $900-$8,700 to publish a single math article, with a median of $4,000. Of this, 70% 
is editorial and production first-copy cost: that is, the cost before reproduction and distribution. 
Thus, most of the cost to be recovered by a going concern is fixed. Pricing at marginal cost will 
not recover first-copy costs. Competition in publishing, however, creates pressure to price at 
marginal cost. When most publishers are printing on paper, and thus have similar cost structures, 
an uneasy equilibrium with prices above marginal cost appears to be stable, possibly supported by 
significant lags in the movement of editors and journal content between publishers in response to 
competitive pricing changes. However, the advent of electronic publishing brings a medium with 
potentially lower first-copy costs. In the U.S. telecommunications industry, local access firms face 
a similar situation when "bypass" operators who need not pay the fixed costs of universal service 
are able to offer large customers lower rates for connection to long distance networks. Likewise, 
in publishing there is an increasing threat from "bypass publishing" [11]. Increased electronic 
competition pressures print-on-paper publishers to find new ways to recover first-copy costs 
without loading them all on per copy (or per subscription) pricing. In part, print-on-paper 
publishers respond to electronic competition by seeking to develop electronic delivery media. They 
also are investing to develop various new value-added services based on the investment in 
first-copy scholarly literature creation, in order to share the recovery of fixed costs across more 
activities. However, these incremental activities involve development expenditures and increase the 
publisher's risk since the new products are often untested and of uncertain value. 
Survey of Pricing and Bundling in Other Industries 
Electronic publishing facilitates flexible usage measurement and recombination of products. As 
a consequence, a wide range of opportunities is opened for nonlinear pricing and innovative 
product bundling [12] (See Figure 2). While working on its own pricing and bundling plans, 
Elsevier Science undertook research on pricing for electronic services in other industries: content, 
telecommunications, Internet service, etc. Both online and CD-ROM pricing were studied. We 
describe findings for two relevant industries here: 
. 
. 
Long distance providers. An historical cycle between flat and variable rates is apparent in the 
U.S. long distance telecommunications industry (Figure 1). For many years, flat-rate pricing 
was the preferred method. Over time, knowledge about users, system capabilities for dealing 
with payments, and the number of competing suppliers increased. Consequently, pricing 
became more complicated, with extensive differentiation by customer group and usage 
characteristics. More recently, there has been an apparent customer backlash against the 
complexity of pricing schemes, and transparent flat pricing has been re-introduced. 
Online database providers. In the 1970s and 1980s, most online database providers used 
connect time as a price basis. This scheme was easily understood, search costs were easy to 
calculate, and a wide range of databases could be accommodated. However, users perceived 
several disadvantages from connect-time pricing: connect time was not easy to predict and 
thus was difficult to budget; inefficient searchers were penalized; and the value of a system's 
interactive potential was not realized since connect time discouraged browsing. Meanwhile, 
users took advantage of technological advancements, such as increased transmission and 
search speeds, to decrease connect-time costs. In response, several online database providers 
introduced new pricing schemes in the early 1980s, with variable pricing based on the 
number of hits, search terms, the type of file search, an up-front access fee, time differentials, 
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Early 1980s 
• Non-recurring fees 
and monthly fees 
were flat rate 
• Banding was a type o f /  
flat rate usage pricing / 
Mid 1980s 
• Virtual banding led to 
variable usage pricing 
• Usage volume discounts 
led to even more variable 
pricing 
F l a t - R a t e  
V a r i a b l e  R a t e  
Early 1990s 
• improvements in billing led to a 
proliferation of variable pricing 
packages 
• Flat fees (non-recurring and 
recurring) were virtually 
eliminated 
Figure 1. Telecommunications pricing in the U.S. 
Mid 1990s 
• Complexity and 
unpredlcatablllty of 
variable pricing led 
customers to request 
flat usage pricing 
etc. [13]. The most common schemes today are based on connect hours, offiine hits/prints, 
and online displays. Industry participants expect subscription plans to become increasingly 
important over the next 5 years. 
Opportunities with Electronic Access: Bundling and Nonlinear Pricing 
Although libraries and publishers both face significant problems, some of them the result of 
developments in electronic access, such access also creates opportunities for dealing with those 
problems. Electronic access enables both publishers and libraries to engage in new product 
bundling and nonlinear pricing schemes. The first will often involve unbundling of traditional 
journal components and then rebundling in a greater variety of packages, some of them customized 
for customers, or customizable by them. Nonlinear pricing is facilitated by lower transactions costs 
for fine-grained purchases and feasible direct usage monitoring by the publisher or library. 
New bundling and pricing schemes are enabling technologies: they liberate previously unreal- 
ized sources of value from existing content and from new value-added services. For example, 
bundling can do a better job of extracting revenue from users who value the same content 
differently. Nonlinear pricing can "sor t"  users by their preference for new services and extract 
more of their differing values. Publishers earn returns on their innovations that can offset fixed 
publishing costs. By spreading those fixed costs over more streams of revenue, they can recover 
them with less quantity distortion and vulnerability to competition. In a competitive publishing 
environment, consumers get to keep most or all of the newly liberated surplus (excess of value over 
cost). An example of finding new value from old content would be differential charges to various 
user types for access to traditional content. Differential charging might be hard to implement for 
print-on-paper publication because there is little opportunity to observe actual differences in usage. 
With electronic access, however, it can be possible to distinguish between, say, retrieval of 
abstracts or bibliographic records vs. retrieval of full text. Since users typically value different uses 
of content differently, a system of differential charges to recover cost of service can extract more 
value from a heterogeneous set of uses. There are a variety of different schemes that fall under the 
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general rubrics of price discrimination or nonlinear pricing. The general result in the economics 
literature is that when it is possible to distinguish between different user or usage types, and when 
resale between parties or uses (arbitrage) is costly or preventable, then nonlinear pricing extracts 
more value than does uniform pricing. 
The simplest example of nonlinear pricing is perfect price discrimination. Imagine that it is 
possible for the service provider to perfectly observe exactly how much each different transaction 
is worth to every user and to charge accordingly. Obviously, the service provider is then able to 
extract the maximum possible revenue to recover costs and support new services. In general, such 
perfect differentiation is not possible. The key to differential pricing is to find observable 
characteristics (of users, or their uses of content) that are correlated with their willingness to pay, 
and then to base charges on the value information that is partially revealed. Electronic access 
provides an opportunity to observe a variety of such characteristics, such as user type (education, 
business, subscriber, or occasional, determined from authentication records), use type (immediacy 
of access to current information, volume, full documents, or components), and quality (display 
resolution, text only or images, plain text or formatted). 
The second type of opportunity is to extract value from new service provision. The literature is 
full of new services that may be enabled by electronic access. We will summarize a few here just 
to illustrate the opportunities: 
1. Hyperlinks. It is possible to prepare documents with embedded hypertext links to referenced 
material. The electronic version of this article is a simple example: references within the 
document can be followed quickly; for example, from the table of contents to section text. 
When more documents are available in electronic archives, it will be possible to embed links 
to more external references as well, as we have done where possible. For example, some 
research working papers archived by the Economics Working Papers Archive project embed 
references to other papers stored in the archive, making it possible to simply click on a 
reference and retrieve a copy. 
2. Dynamic commentary. Many authors have puzzled about the interaction between electronic 
publishing and peer review. The main conflict observed is that the peer review process in 
most disciplines is quite lengthy and defeats some of the publication timeliness that can be 
gained by electronic publication and distribution. One novel theme that has emerged is that 
the peer review process may be replaced in part by dynamic, public commentary and 
response [ 14,15]. Readers could post comments and critiques directly to the archive where 
an article is stored; authors could reply. In response to some comments, revised versions of 
a paper might be posted. Thereby, the review process might be more open, inclusive, timely, 
and dynamic. 
3. Social filtering. One of the obvious impacts of widespread communication networks is that 
the geography of community can change. One opportunity provided by virtual communities 
is the application of networks of like-minded people to the problem of information filtering. 
Every scholar faces the problem of selecting which articles to read from the vast flow of new 
material [ 16]. Social filtering systems collect the ratings of networked users and then, based 
on some form of cluster analysis, dynamically match one user's preferences to the prefer- 
ences of others to prepare recommendations. For example, Professor X is matched to 10 
other professors who have given similar ratings on articles they have mostly all read; the 
system then recommends to Professor X a previously unread article that the match group has 
liked. Such a system might, for example, supplement asking only one's local colleagues for 
advice. Firefly is a working example of a social filtering system (providing recommenda- 
tions on audio recordings and films). 
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PEAK: A FIELD TRIAL 
The University of Michigan has agreed with Elsevier on a pricing field trial, "Pricing Electronic 
Access to Knowledge" (PEAK). This negotiated trial permits Michigan to provide a host service 
for 3 years (1996-1998) of all the approximately 1,200 Elsevier Science scholarly titles. Once the 
trial is under way, articles will become available as quickly as they do for any Elsevier Electronic 
Subscriptions customer, which is to say, within a few weeks of the mail distribution of the 
print-on-paper version. Michigan will provide Internet-based delivery to participants in the trial, 
which will include users both on and off campus. The University of Michigan has substantial 
experience in the provision of high-bandwidth host service for large volumes of scholarly material. 
The PEAK project will be implemented by the same team responsible for the technical aspects of 
the NSF/ARPA UM Digital Library project and the production JSTOR project. For example, 
JSTOR provides access to the entire historical (pre-1990) corpus of material from 18 journals 
spanning economics, history, political science, population, and ecology (the earliest issue available 
dates to 1886). Approximately 100 titles will be available within 2 years, with about a dozen new 
fields represented. Although there are far more titles in the Elsevier corpus, the run lengths will be 
considerably shorter. From its experience with JSTOR and other projects, the University of 
Michigan has developed a full digital production service and currently hosts more than a terabyte 
of indexed document data on high-speed disk systems. (The University of Michigan was also one 
of the original host sites and developers of TULIP, The University Licensing Project, sponsored by 
Elsevier Science.) 
For PEAK, Michigan will create a variety of access models and administer a pricing system. The 
agreement is designed explicitly to support experimental field research; thus, there will be 
experimental variation in the bundles and prices offered to clients. In this section we shall describe 
in some detail the structure of the experiment. There are three major design components: 
1. Economic design: Specification of the product bundles and the price structure. 
2. Experimental design: Implementation of the economic design to obtain statistically infor- 
mative data. 
3. Technical implementation. 
Economic Design 
Electronic access directly provides the opportunity to unbundle and rebundle scholarly litera- 
ture. A print-on-paper journal is a bundle of issues, each of which is a bundle of articles and other 
items, each of which is a bundle of bibliographic information, an abstract, references, text, figures, 
and so forth. It is often straightforward (although it does not necessarily cost less) to rebundle any 
of these elements in different ways when the source material is archived in electronic form. For 
example, one might obtain all abstracts matching a given keyword search, all citations appearing 
in a particular article, or just the bibliographic headers from the articles appearing in a given year. 
From the beginning, the PEAK project was designed to explore bundling alternatives as well as 
pricing structures. The specification of product bundles turns out to be a difficult task because the 
space of possible bundles is extraordinarily large, even if each component of a document is treated 
as identical across documents (e.g., do not define articles by two different authors to be different 
commodities for the purpose of bundling). To see this problem, consider bundles defined over just 
three possible dimensions for electronically accessed scholarly documents: 
1. article component (abstract, references, text, etc.), 
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Figure 2. Hypothetical bundling possibilities. 
2. time limit on usage (unlimited, per use, per year, etc.), and 
3. usage rights (read only, read and print, etc.). 
From a rather simple population of the matrix of possibilities, we can postulate 160 possible 
different bundles (Figure 2) before even specifying different bundle quantities. For example, we 
might offer a 1-year right to read only N abstracts. If  bundles were priced differently for, say, 
N = { 1, 10, 100, unlimited}, then the space increases to 640 possible bundles. 
Although an explicit goal of the field trial was to explore new opportunities aftbrded by 
electronic access, feasibility constraints led to a rather limited selection of bundle types to 
implement. One important constraint is experimental variation: with a somewhat limited number of 
different observational units, we cannot obtain sufficient variation to explore very many bundle 
types. A second constraint is customer acceptance: although this is being operated as a research 
project by the University of Michigan, the experimental subjects are operational research libraries 
and individual users who must find the offerings palatable enough for participation to be worth- 
while. After numerous meetings with library collection experts and potential participants, the 
project team decided on three bundles to offer: 
1. Per article. Users can purchase unlimited access to a specific article for a fixed price. 
Standard monopoly analysis shows how to calculate the optimal tariff. The monopolist must 
produce a level of output that is less than the Pareto efficient amount. In this sense, this 
scheme will provide an inefficient level of output. 
2. Traditional subscription. Users can purchase unlimited access to a set of articles designated 
as a journal volume by the publisher. These volumes will correspond to the Elsevier 
print-on-paper journal titles. 
3. Generalized subscription. Users can purchase unlimited access to a set of N articles selected 
by the user. (The number N will correspond approximately to the average number of articles, 
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by discipline, included in a traditional subscription.) Users can purchase additional incre- 
ments of N articles. 
The time duration for each of the product bundles is the life of the project + 1 year [17]. The usage 
rights for a document will generally be the same as those for an Elsevier article distributed as print 
on paper (e.g., U.S. users can print a copy for personal archival purposes, but may not redistribute 
it further except as provided under the fair use doctrine). 
The first and second products are intended to match as closely as possible the best known 
traditional product bundles [ 18]. This conservatism should assist in customer acceptance of the trial 
and allow better comparisons between electronic and print-on-paper experience. The third option 
is more novel. The generalized subscription is designed to test the opportunity provided by 
unbundling and rebundling without straying too far from the other product bundles. Limiting 
product variations to only one dimension will improve statistical inference about the effects of the 
different bundling schemes. Although the planned product bundles do not deviate far from 
traditional bundles, they do permit some interesting user choices. In particular, generalized 
subscriptions allow users to prepay and thus obtain the administrative advantage of budget 
predictability, yet also allow users the flexibility to choose only articles they want. Indeed, users 
can bundle articles across journals, and even across traditional disciplines. This shares the risk of 
paying for unwanted articles with the publisher. Consequently, the value per article accessed should 
generally be higher to the user than under a traditional subscription, and the per article average 
price can be correspondingly higher for generalized subscriptions. In short, users trade off an 
up-front commitment against the benefits of greater customization and the ability to select articles 
post-publication. Publishers gain by having a significant revenue stream that is predictable and by 
direct feedback on which articles, from across several journals, readers value most highly. 
Recall that the literature on bundling has primarily focused on whether sellers would prefer pure 
unbundling, pure bundling, or mixed bundling (offering buyers a choice of bundling or unbundling). 
Our product design and experimental implementation will provide observations on all three types. Some 
customers will be offered only a per article (pure unbundling) service. Others will be offered only a 
subscription (pure bundling) service. Still others will have a choice between subscription or per article 
pricing. However, the products are more complex than those studied thus far in the bundling literature. 
The differences are largely due to our attempt to maintain plausible comparability to existing print-on- 
paper offerings while still designing a controlled experiment. For example, our "mixed bundling" is 
more general than the form studied in the literature. Customers do not need to choose just subscriptions 
or alternatively individual articles; a customer might purchase some subscriptions and supplement them 
with per article purchases. This feature highlights the other necessary complexity: the fact that 
subscriptions are actually "sub-bundles." In the papers by Chuang and Sirbu [19] and Bakos and 
Brynjolfsson [20], only one bundle at a time is considered, which consists of either all or a subset of all 
articles. In practice, publishers offer several bundles, each as a different journal title. Sizable publishers 
never limit their bundles to a single, all-article bundle. Thus, the value of per article and mixed bundling 
to the provider will necessarily be conditional on the particular set of sub-bundles (journal titles) the 
publisher offers [21]. 
The variety of nonlinear pricing structures is essential unbounded: any nonlinear, monotonically 
increasing relationship between total payment and quantity (of something) purchased is admissible. 
Although a field trial offers some possibility to explore the space of pricing structures, we again 
face feasibility and participation constraints. In particular, because we are also varying product 
bundles, the number of different pricing schemes that we can implement and still obtain sufficient 
data for statistical inference is very limited. Within the class of general nonlinear pricing schemes, 
a large number have been specifically studied and implemented in various industries. These are 
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Revenues(q) 
Three-part 
~ _  Linear 
Two-part 
Nonlinear 
Fixed fee ~ ~ Block 
quantity 
Figure 3. Various nonlinear pricing schemes. 
illustrated in Figure 3, which shows the relationship between revenues and quantity for a linear 
scheme, second-degree price discrimination (block pricing), a two-part and a three-part tariff, a 
fixed fee, and a generic nonlinear scheme. 
The project team plans to implement three-part tariff pricing (Figure 4). There is an entry fee, 
or up-front payment merely to participate. For that fee, the user obtains a fixed amount of access 
with no additional charge, with the quantity specified by a breakpoint. After reaching the 
breakpoint quantity of usage, incremental access is charged at a flat per unit price. Note that a 
three-part tariff can be applied to any of the above product bundles: the bundle type determines the 
appropriate measure of usage quantity. For example, with traditional subscriptions, a library might 
pay an initial fee that grants it rights to 10 subscription titles; for each additional subscription there 
is a fixed additional charge. The structure would be similar for generalized subscriptions, or per 
article. The three-part tariff is a rather general structure, with three degrees of freedom. It 
encompasses two-part tariffs (set the breakpoint to zero), fixed fee (set the breakpoint to infinity), 
Revenue(q) 
(1) 
(1) "Entry" fee 
-- say, 0.5% of current 
subs 
(2) Breakpoint 
-- K articles, based on 
# of current titles 
-- e.g., $5/title 
(3) Increments 
-- price per additional 
article 
(2) quantity 
Figure 4. Three-part tariff explained. 
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and linear pricing (set the entry fee and breakpoint to zero). When the number of participants is 
identified, the project team will determine which of the three parameters should be subject to 
experimental variation in order to estimate the responsiveness of user demand to different pricing 
structures. It is also important to recognize that the distinction between bundling and nonlinear 
pricing is not always clear. For example, a user might combine various bundles to construct its own 
three-part tariff by, say, purchasing five generalized subscriptions (to obtain 5N articles at a fixed, 
up-front price), and then purchasing additional articles at the per article price. 
E x p e r i m e n t a l  D e s i g n  
The PEAK field trial provides an unprecedented opportunity for exploring bundling and 
nonlinear pricing opportunities afforded by electronic access. The key research objective, however, 
is the ability to generalize to other user populations and other scholarly materials. Experimental 
design considerations are therefore paramount and impose significant constraints on the range of 
bundling and pricing schemes than can be studied. The fundamental principle of experimental 
design is that we learn from variation: how do users respond differently when confronted with 
different alternative bundles or price structures? To obtain a sufficiently rich set of observations to 
draw inferences from the effects of design parameter variation, we must significantly restrict the 
number of dimensions that vary. These concerns were reflected in the discussion of bundles and 
price structures above. There are a number of other interesting features of the experimental design 
that we describe below. 
. 
2. 
Product diversity. Elsevier is making available approximately 1,200 different journal titles 
for the trial. This corpus includes titles in virtually every academic discipline. The style, 
quality, price, and other features of these journals cover a very wide range. Further, scholarly 
usage styles appear to differ significantly across disciplines. Therefore, product diversity 
potentially creates a source of difficult-to-control nonexperimental variation. To limit this 
problem, the experimental design calls for limiting the trial to a few disciplines in which 
Elsevier titles have an especially strong presence: engineering, medical science, and eco- 
nomics [22]. 
Customer diversity. Scholarly journals have narrow, specialized audiences. Even within a 
community as large as the University of Michigan (some 30,000 students, of whom about 
10,000 are in graduate school, and about 3,200 research faculty), there are likely to be only 
a few readers for many speciality journals. Only a fraction of these are likely to participate 
in an electronic access trial. Therefore, in order to obtain sufficient participation and usage, 
the project was designed to include clients from a number of organizations outside the 
University of Michigan. The preliminary participant list includes other research universities 
and industrial research facilities. There may also be participating 4-year undergraduate 
colleges. Although the sample size of users for each subset of literature is increased by 
including multiple institutions, broader scope also creates design problems. There will be 
greater diversity in physical facilities, marketing and communications to participants, and 
institutional arrangements. The latter is of special concern. Participation in the trial will occur 
both by institutional and individual decision makers. For example, both will be able to 
subscribe, and both will be able to purchase on a per article basis. The behavior of a rational 
and well-informed individual user will be conditioned on the behavior by her associated 
institution [23]. For example, an individual might subscribe to a journal only if the organi- 
zation's library does not. This complication is probably unavoidable and will pose challenges 
for the proper statistical analysis of the results. 
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. Duration and learning. This trial involves a rather novel access mode for scholarly literature. 
Although Michigan has substantial institutional experience from TULIP, JSTOR, UMDL, 
and other projects, most individual users of  scholarly literature on campus have little or no 
experience with electronic access to traditional scholarly journals. Users at the other partic- 
ipating ins t i tu t ions--both  individual and inst i tu t ional--are  likely to be even less experi- 
enced. The learning process will complicate efforts to uncover generalizable results. The 
project team will actively educate potential users about the trial, the products, and the pricing. 
Further, we will be collecting data over a 2- to 3-year period and, thus, will have some chance 
to isolate learning effects. Although not really part of the experimental design, there are also 
a number of technical issues that must be overcome to complete the implementation of  the 
PEAK project. These include the implementation of an accounting system and a payment 
mechanism, and user authentication to the access system. As much as possible we are relying 
on off-the-shelf or already implemented local solutions. 
CONCLUSION 
In the introduction period of  electronic publishing, pricing of electronic products will be linked 
more to the print prices due to the uncertainties involved. But, Elsevier Science intends to work 
with an electronic access pricing model in the future that will be based on: 
I. the value of  the functionalities for a specific customer group, 
2. the amount of  users making use of the products, and 
3. how often each user uses the product. 
In addition, Elsevier  is developing advanced electronic applications that will be offered in various 
bundles with traditional journal access. Thus, the fu ture- - f rom many publ i shers - -appears  likely 
to include nonlinear and differential pricing, as well as innovative production bundling. In order 
to structure prices around the value components above, a publisher needs to learn about consumer 
preferences and usage. To this end, Elsevier Science has entered the agreement with Michigan to 
implement a field experiment on bundling and nonlinear pricing. Other experiments with different 
host institutions are l ikely in the future. The space for electronic access product bundling and 
pricing structures is immense. Many field trials will be required to explore even a limited set of 
important alternatives. 
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